whilst the writer of identification and fact authorised Langevin's recommendation that Meyerson "identify the idea procedures" of Einstein's relativity conception, he grew to become from his guaranteed standpoint as historian of the sciences to the dicy bias of latest philosophical critic. yet Emile Meyerson, the epis­ temologist as historian, couldn't discover a extra rigorous attempt of his conclusions from old studying than the translation of Einstein's paintings, except probably he have been to show from the classical revolution of Einstein's relativity to the non-classical quantum conception. Meyerson captures our sympathy in all his writings: " . . . the position of the epistemologist is . . . in following the advance of technological know-how" (250); the learn of the evolution of cause leads us to work out that "man doesn't adventure himself reasoning . . . that's carried on unconsciously," and because the summation of his empirical experiences of the works and practices of scientists, "reason . . . behaves in an altogether expect­ capable approach: . . . first through making the resultant corresponding to the antecedent, after which via really denying all range in house" (202). If common sense - and to Meyerson the epistemologist is truth seeker - is to appreciate cause, then "logic proceeds a posteriori. " And so we're confronted with an empirically dependent Par­ menides, and, as we will see, with an ineliminable 'irrational' inside technological know-how. Meyerson's tale, written in 1924, remains to be interesting, 60 years later.